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Svoboda party – the new phenomenon 
on the Ukrainian right-wing scene
Tadeusz A. Olszański
Even though the national-level political scene in Ukraine is dominated by 
the Party of Regions, the west of the country has seen a progressing incre-
ase in the activity of the Svoboda (Freedom) party, a group that combines 
participation in the democratically elected local government of Eastern 
Galicia with street actions, characteristic of anti-system groups. This party 
has brought a new quality to the Ukrainian nationalist movement, as it 
refers to the rhetoric of European anti-liberal and neo-nationalist move-
ments, and its emergence is a clear response to public demand for a group 
of this sort. The increase in its popularity plays into the hands of the Party 
of Regions, which is seeking to weaken the more moderate opposition 
parties (mainly the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc). However, Svoboda retains its 
independence from the ruling camp. This party, in all likelihood, will beco-
me a permanent and important player in Ukrainian political life, although 
its influence may be restricted to Eastern Galicia.
Svoboda is determined to fight the tendencies in Ukrainian politics and the 
social sphere which it considers pro-Russian. Its attitude towards Russia 
and Russians, furthermore, is unambiguously hostile. In the case of Poland, 
it reduces mutual relations almost exclusively to the historical aspects, 
strongly criticising the commemoration of the victims of the Ukrainian 
Insurgent Army’s (UPA) crimes. This may cause tension in Polish-Ukrainian 
relations, where they are affected by decisions made by local governments 
controlled by the Svoboda Party.
From Social-Nationalist Party of Ukraine to Svoboda
Svoboda was founded as the Social-Nationalist Party of Ukraine (SNPU) in October 1991, 
and among its founders were members of anti-communist organizations from Lviv. Its emer-
gence was a part of the process of the Ukrainian independence movement branching off 
into national democrats and radical nationalists. The national democrats tried to combine 
liberal and nationalist rhetoric whereas the radical nationalists questioned or simply rejected 
liberal solutions. The party advocated the social nationalist ideology by combining radical 
nationalism with equally radical social rhetoric. Among the canons of its ideology there was: 
a vision of the nation as a natural community, the primacy of the nation’s rights over human 
rights, the urge to build an ‘ethnic economy’, but also an openly racist rhetoric concerning 
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‘white supremacy’. Therefore, it seems justified that this programme has been compared 
to National Socialism from its very beginning, and not to the traditional ideology of radical 
Ukrainian nationalism. This parallel was reinforced by the party’s symbol – the letters I + N 
(Idea of the Nation), that is graphically identical with the ‘Wolfsangel’ rune – one of the 
symbols of European neo-Nazi organisations.
In 1998, Oleh Tyahnybok, the deputy head of the SNPU (in charge of organisational is-
sues) was elected member of Verkhovna Rada, the Ukrainian parliament, winning a seat 
in a single-member district. After his re-election in 2002 (while his party, the SNPU, re-
ceived only marginal support), he was already strong enough to lead the party. A year on, 
the ‘Wolfsangel’ disappeared from the party’s symbols, and in February 2004 it changed 
its name to All-Ukrainian Union ‘Svoboda’. The party changed its symbol to a hand with 
three fingers stretched that symbolised a Tryzub (trident), a popular gesture during pro-
independence demonstrations in the late 1980s. The radical neo-Nazi and racist groups 
were pushed out from the party.
However, Tyahnybok never concealed that these changes were made primarily for image 
purposes. The party remains associated with the ‘wide social nationalist movement’ com-
prised of numerous organisations (and 
websites) and gathered around the Social-
Nationalist Assembly which was set up 
in 2008. The Internet ‘Joseph Goebbels 
Political Research Centre’ (the centre later 
changed Goebbels for Ernst Jünger) was 
founded in 2005 by Yuri Mykhailyshyn, 
Tyahnybok’s adviser, who topped the Svoboda party list in the elections to Lviv’s municipal 
council in 20101. Ukraine’s Patriot, a paramilitary organisation disbanded in 2004 and 
re-established in 2005 in a different legal form2, is still associated with Svoboda. This or-
ganisation still uses the ‘Wolfsangel’ symbol, although transformed in such a way that its 
interpretation as ‘I + N’ is no longer possible.
Back in the mid-1990s, the SNPU established contacts with European parties and move-
ments from the extreme right: open contacts with the National Front of France, and covert 
ones with neo-Nazi organizations. In the autumn of 2009, Svoboda joined the Alliance of 
European National Movements as the only organisation from outside the European Union.
Having introduced the aforementioned changes, Svoboda has begun to gain force. In 2004 
it declared a membership of five thousand, but by 2010 this number increased threefold to 
15 thousand. In the parliamentary elections of 2006 the party won a mere 0.3% of votes 
(an average of 2.1% in Eastern Galicia), in the early parliamentary elections in 2007 – 0.7% 
(3.3% in Galicia), and in the presidential elections in 2010 Tyahnybok was supported by 
1.4% of voters (4.7% in Galicia). The 2010 municipal elections brought a breakthrough: 
Svoboda gained an average of 25.7% votes in Eastern Galicia, and its candidates won 
in most of the single-member districts. As a result, Svoboda co-formed majority coalitions in 
regional councils, and in Lviv, Ternopil, Ivano-Frankivsk and several smaller towns the party 
has an independent majority. Ternopil remains, however, the only city where the party can 
govern independently because its mayor is the member of this party.
Following the municipal elections in 2010, Svoboda was faced with new challenges – after 
taking over power, it had to demonstrate its competence and incorruptibility, as well as 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 For details see: http://2000.
net.ua/2000/derzhava/eksperti-
za/71527. The centre’s website 
(http://nachtigall88.livejournal.
com) was closed in the spring 
of 2011 and has probably 
reappeared under a changed 
name. The website had publi-
shed translations of articles by 
Alfred Rosenberg, Ernst Röhm 
and Joseph Goebbels (from 
Russian versions). The number 
88 in the name of the website 
is a digital equivalent of the 
abbreviation HH (Heil Hitler), 
commonly used by European 
neo-Nazis. 
2 SNPU established this organisa-
tion in 1999 as an Association 
of Support for the Armed Forces 
and Navy of Ukraine.
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According to the polls available, 
Svoboda can be sure to enter parlia-
ment in 2012 even in if the electoral 
threshold is raised to 5%.
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the ability to reach compromises and to balance conflicting local interests (including eco-
nomic ones). Meanwhile, Svoboda’s staff potential is rather modest – many councillors’ 
mandates were taken over by students. At the moment it is difficult to assess how Svo-
boda’s representatives manage in the representative bodies of local government; it is worth 
noting that they continue to present themselves in the media as the opposition. Allegations 
of corruption that appear from time to time do not seem very credible, one reason being that 
these bodies have a limited range of decisions to make.
How Svoboda handles its ‘governance’ test, will affect the future of the party, especially its 
results in the parliamentary elections of 2012; entering parliament currently seems to be 
the party’s main goal. According to the polls available, the party can be sure to enter parlia-
ment even in if the electoral threshold is raised to 5%, it may also win over ten mandates 
in single-member districts.
Svoboda’s anti-liberal programme
According to Svoboda’s official program dated 20093 and its draft constitution of 20074, 
the party aims to build ‘a powerful Ukrainian State based on the principles of social and 
national justice’. The ‘rights of the nation’ are to be given primacy over human and civil 
rights. The form of government is to be presidential, and Ukraine is to be a unitary state, 
with Crimean autonomy abolished. The economic program is explicitly statist; many ideas 
run counter to the trends that are prevalent in developed countries (such as the demand 
to abolish VAT). Farmlands are to be state-owned and given to farmers in hereditary use. 
The state is to implement a firm pro-family policy and attach importance to health care.
Svoboda is the only influential political force in Ukraine to call for a radical de-communi-
sation of the state administration that would eliminate those employees of state structures 
who had been active before 1991. This demand, designed to force a generation change, sig-
nificantly reduces the party’s chances of 
attracting new supporters from the older 
generation. This demand is accompanied 
by an appeal for a thorough de-commu-
nisation of the public space (monuments, 
names of streets and places, etc.) and 
a demand that Russia apologise for its 
communist crimes.
The strategic direction of the state is to be ‘European Ukraine-centrism’ which should guar-
antee Ukraine’s status as ‘not only geographical, but also a geopolitical centre of Europe’. 
Ukraine is to leave the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and other post-Soviet 
structures, demand an explicit guarantee of accession to NATO within a set period of time, 
and to once again become a possessor of tactical nuclear weapons. The European Union is 
not even mentioned in the programme. 
Ethnocentrism is a pivotal element of Svoboda’s program. The nationality of a citizen is to 
become a public category. An ethnic census is to be implemented in the bodies of execu-
tive power, the armed forces, education, science, and even in the economy: their national 
composition is to strictly correspond to the proportion of Ukrainians and ethnic minorities. 
Similarly, the share of the Ukrainian language in the media is to be no smaller than the 
proportion of ethnic Ukrainians in society. The only official language of state structures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 For details see http://svoboda.
org.ua/pro_partiyu/prohrama/ 
accessed on May 25, 2011. 
The document has been 
registered in the Ministry 
of Justice and is therefore 
an official document.
4 http://svoboda.org.ua/pro_par-
tiyu/prohrama/konstytutsiya/ 
accessed on May 25, 2011.
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Anti-Polonism remains an issue of se-
condary importance both in Svoboda’s 
rhetoric and programme: 
the party considers its main and inde-
ed dangerous enemy to be Russia 
and Russians.
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(including the sphere of education) is to be Ukrainian, and the rights of national minorities 
are to be restricted to the creation of associations. On the other hand, Svoboda’s policy 
documents contain no racist elements. 
Apart from the official program, there is also an unofficial one, not written down in docu-
ment form, but implicit in statements and actions by members of Svoboda. It is much 
more radical, and racist5. In their outlook upon the nation, the ‘new’ nationalists reject the 
previous, biologistic concept of a national community (the nation as equivalent to species) 
and opt for the idea that the nation is an ‘incarnation of the idea of history in the dialectical 
development of the spirit’6. This kind of neo-Romantic approach, consistent with the spirit 
of postmodernism, makes it practically impossible to hold rational debates with Svoboda’s 
programme. 
Other references to Svoboda’s unofficial programme are their large-scale propaganda ac-
tions taken on the anniversary of SS Division ‘Galizien’, repeated attempts to interrupt the 
celebrations in honour of Poles murdered by the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) in Huta 
Pieniacka, appeals to Russian residents of Lviv to ‘Ukrainise’ the names of their children, 
attacks on demonstrations for the legalisation of marijuana, acceptance of controversial 
statements on the party forum that approve of Hitler’s activities7, etc.
Svoboda is definitely negatively disposed 
towards the ‘historical dialogue with 
Poland’ (as well as with any other of 
Ukraine’s neighbours). According to the 
party, whatever Ukrainians did to the rep-
resentatives of other nations in the past 
was at the very least justified, whereas 
whatever Russians, Poles, Hungarians 
and others did to Ukrainians, was unjusti-
fied or usually criminal. Hence the activi-
ties such as picketing Polish commemoration ceremonies in Ukraine, questioning their right 
to erect monuments in honour of murdered Poles, and accusing Poles of mass murders of 
the Ukrainian population, etc. This has caused friction in Polish-Ukrainian relations and 
will continue to do so in the future, whenever these ceremonies will be attended by repre-
sentatives of local authorities controlled by Svoboda. Despite these actions, anti-Polonism 
remains an issue of secondary importance both in Svoboda’s rhetoric and programme: 
the party considers its main and indeed dangerous enemy to be Russia and Russians.
Svoboda in Ukrainian politics
Svoboda’s political success has caught the attention of media and political analysts. 
Two trends are particularly clear – the demonisation of the party as a ‘Nazi menace’, and the 
tendency to disregard it as a puppet organisation. The former opinion was promoted by the 
media associated with the Party of Regions, the Communists and Russophile groups, and 
the latter by groups related to the national-democratic parties in western Ukraine and the 
Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc, who even claimed that the pro-government media’s marked interest 
in Svoboda was proof that the party is a puppet if not a spy ring.
 
 
 
 
 
5 A song popular among Svoboda 
activists refers to attempts to 
restitute the Ukrainian state 
in the summer of 1941, under 
the patronage of the Third 
Reich: ‘Nachtigal and Roland 
army liberate the Aryan country 
/ Aryan country, Ukraine…’. 
For details see: Ostap Kryvdyk, 
Neyakisnyi natsionalism, 
http://www.pravda.com.ua/
articles/2011/04/20/6122719/
view_print/, 
accessed on April 21, 2011.
6 A statement by Andriy Illyenko, 
a member of the Svoboda 
leadership, quoted after: 
http://www.unian.net/news/
print.php?id=321062, 
accessed on April 21, 2011.
7 See: http://www.forum.vosvo-
boda.info/viewtopic_10853.
php, accessed on June 8, 
2011. This is a discussion 
forum thread on Svoboda’s 
official website.
However, the fact that the activity 
of Svoboda is convenient for 
the Party of Regions in the short 
term does not mean that Svoboda 
is controlled by the Party of Regions. 
Svoboda is undoubtedly an indepen-
dent political force.
i s s u e  5 6  |  0 4 . 0 7 . 2 0 1 1  |  c e N T R e  f O R  e A s T e R N  s T u d i e s
cOMMeNTARyOsw
OSW.WAW.PL 5
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8 Compare Aleksei Mustafin, 
‘Osvobozhdeniye’ po na-
imu?, http://www.zn.u-
a/1000/1550/70655/?print-
preview accessed on October 
25, 2010.
Despite these allegations, there is no doubt that the SNPU and Svoboda owe their suc-
cess to the growing social demand for a radically chauvinist programme and organisation. 
The possible inspiration of the secret services (which is always difficult to prove) could have 
played only a secondary part in this case, and could have resulted from a belief that the 
social-national movement has significant potential.
The same can be said about the suggestions that Svoboda’s leadership is manipulated by 
the Party of Regions. It is true that the expansion of Svoboda is currently (at least until 
parliamentary elections next year) convenient for the Party of Regions. On the one hand, 
it reduces the possibility of the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc taking over the nationalist electorate, 
and thus weakens this party. On the other hand, it is an excellent way to consolidate the 
electorate of the Party of Regions, who may begin to turn their backs on the ruling party be-
cause of the adverse effects of the reforms 
planned. The voters from the eastern and 
southern parts of the country (especially 
the elderly and the less educated) are at-
tached to the Soviet ‘historical narrative’ 
of the Great Patriotic War, and are there-
fore implacably hostile to the Organisation 
of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and the 
Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA). It would not take much effort to convince them that 
Svoboda is an inheritor of the Nazi invaders and a threat to peace, and that the Party 
of Regions should be voted for as the only force capable of stopping the ‘brown revenge’.
However, the fact that the activity of Svoboda is convenient for the Party of Regions in the 
short term does not mean that Svoboda is controlled by the Party of Regions. Svoboda is 
undoubtedly an independent political force with clearly defined objectives, determined to 
seek their implementation. It is ready to accept help from its enemies (e.g. by accepting 
invitations to major political TV programmes, with probable consent from the government), 
including financial assistance (the common belief is that Svoboda’s campaign before Terno-
pil district council elections in 2009 was financed by an oligarch, Ihor Kolomoyskyi, who 
was in conflict with Yulia Tymoshenko at the time, although the party itself denies this)8. 
However, it is a manifestation of political cynicism from both sides, rather than evidence 
of a secret agreement or subordination.
Svoboda’s popularity among the residents of western Ukraine is rising thanks to actions by 
the current government such as the support for recognising Russian as an official language, 
promotion of a vision of history (in school textbooks) wherein the Ukrainian ‘historical narra-
tive’ is likened to the Russian one, and the celebration of Moscow’s Patriarch’s subsequent 
visits to Ukraine. Such actions are unacceptable for Ukrainians from the western part of 
the country, as they consider linguistic, cultural and religious independence the ‘apple of 
the eye’ of the national existence. However, the focus on these demands limits Svoboda’s 
chances of expanding beyond the area indicated above, which would mean that the best 
it can achieve is to control local government in three districts of Galicia and create a minor 
faction in the national parliament. It seems that the Party of Regions can tolerate this. Ho-
wever, if Svoboda had a chance to significantly extend its influence beyond this ‘stronghold’, 
the ruling camp would definitely counteract it.
Svoboda’s success illustrates the gro-
wing demand of Ukrainian society 
for a new right-wing party with 
anti-democratic, xenophobic, 
pro-social and pro-family views.
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Conclusions
The All-Ukrainian Union ‘Svoboda’ has become an important element of the Ukrainian po-
litical scene and it is hard to expect that it could be marginalised within the coming decade. 
However, its possible expansion is limited to the Lviv, Ternopil and Ivano-Frankivsk districts 
and to the Galician diaspora in other centres, where it does not make up a significant part of 
electorate (perhaps apart from Kyiv). Svoboda will remain an important player in Ukraine’s 
political life, regardless of whether it becomes a parliamentary party. Its chances in par-
liamentary elections in 2012 mainly depend on how voters evaluate its rule in Galicia, and 
on whether the leadership of the Party of Regions retain their consent for Svoboda’s limited 
success.
Svoboda’s success illustrates the growing demand of Ukrainian society for a new right-wing 
party with anti-democratic, xenophobic, pro-social and pro-family views. A further increase 
in its popularity may trigger the creation and development of groups with a similar programme, 
who would disregard the traditions of Ukrainian nationalism or even openly defy them.
Members and supporters of Svoboda are predominantly young people, willing to actively 
demonstrate their beliefs. And as the party’s programme contains an implicit consent to 
violence, it cannot be ruled out that force will be used repeatedly during different actions 
(on the party’s initiative or in response to the actions of opponents).
Svoboda’s activity has raised serious tension (and will continue to do so) between local au-
thorities in Poland and Ukraine. In some cases – such as the participation of leading Polish 
politicians in ceremonies commemorating the victims of the UPA in Ukraine – this may lead 
to frictions in Polish-Ukrainian bilateral relations. However, this will not affect bilateral rela-
tions at the state level; in all likelihood, the current government will not allow Svoboda to 
influence Ukraine’s foreign policy.
